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Edward R. Leahy*
Justice Brennan's Supreme Court tenure is
commonly divided into two stages.' The early
stage was marked by his opinions written for the
"activist" Warren Court while the later stage is
remembered by his authoring numerous dissents
during the time of a more "conservative" Court.2
While a somewhat useful analytical tool, this dis-
tinction has a tendency to produce a caricature of
a Justice whose power (or lack of it) rested on
fluctuating circumstances. In reality, Justice Bren-
nan's enduring influence is the product of legal
acuity combined with untarnished personal integ-
rity.
It would be a mistake to force Justice Brennan's
thirty-four years on the Supreme Court3 into a sin-
gle strain of thought.4 This tribute by the Com-
mLaw Conspectus, however, provides the opportu-
nity to view Justice Brennan's legacy in light of his
constitutional and personal views on communica-
tions. Constitutionally, justice Brennan believed
in the power of dialogue to enhance democracy
and hence, he was the staunchest defender of the
freedom to speak.5 Personally, Justice Brennan
* Mr. Leahy is presently Distinguished Scholar from
Practice, Boston College Law School and served as a law clerk
to Justice Brennan for the 1974 Supreme Court Term.
I See generally Harry A. Blackmun, A Tribute to Mr. Justice
Brennan, 26 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. I (Winter, 1991);
Thurgood Marshall, A Tribute to Justice William Brennan, Jr.,
104 HARV. L. REV. 1 (Nov., 1990).
2 This distinction has become accepted legal dogma to
the point that legal scholars may feel the need to refer the
"early" or "later" Brennan as one might refer to the early or
later Wittgenstein.
3 Justice Brennan's official period of Supreme Court ser-
vice ran from October 16, 1956 to July 20, 1990.
4 Indeed, aside from the difficulty of synthesizing the
myriad of legal issues with which Justice Brennan dealt, a bi-
ographer would be forced to account for the instances when
the Justice admitted to failings in his earlier thought. For
example, in his dissent in Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413
U.S. 49, 84 (1973), he concluded that his previous definition
of "obscenity"-outlined in the Court's Roth v. United States,
354 U.S. 476 (1957), decision-as "material which appeals to
modeled his own communication on the pillars of
rationality and civility.6
Justice Brennan's communications jurispru-
dence is based on the notion that the powerless or
unpopular person in civil society should never be
kept out of the democratic process through
forced silence. Alternatively, it is proper to assert
that, according to Justice Brennan, the person
with the power of speech is never powerless in our
democracy. Three decisions written by Justice
Brennan manifest this principle brilliantly.
In NAACP v. Button, the Court held unconstitu-
tional Virginia's prohibition of the NAACP's prac-
tice of soliciting plaintiffs for desegregation cases
on the ground that such solicitation Was protected
as an exercise of political expression and right of
association. 7 The facts and underlying history of
the case were simple. In the tumultuous years fol-
lowing the watershed Brown v. Board of Education,8
potential desegregation plaintiffs were oftentimes
justifiably afraid to come forward and speak, while
segregated states such as Virginia used their legis-
the prurient interest of the average person and lacks redeem-
ing social importance" should be withdrawn for its inability
to "reduce the vagueness to a tolerable level."
5 Indeed, I think thatJustice Brennan was genuinely ex-
cited by the Court's ability to assure to all within society the
right to speak freely. Only five years ago, when he wrote to
congratulate this Journal on the publication of its first issue,
he wrote: "The introduction of a new scholarly law journal
devoted to communications law is in occasion to cheer." Wil-
liam J. Brennan, Jr., Remarks, 1 COMMLAw CONSPECTUS 1
(1993).
6 As the reader will see, the comparison of Justice Bren-
nan's constitutional and personal approach to communica-
tions will put to bed the notion that his legal writings were
informed primarily by his personal "agenda." Because, while
Justice Brennan firmly held that "offensive" speech could
still be constitutionally protected, his own approach to speak-
ing and writing provided a model of civility in discourse.
7 See generally 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
8 See generally 347 U.S. 493 (1954).
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lative power to silence those who were not afraid
to speak.
Justice Brennan provided two answers to Vir-
ginia's contention that the NAACP's "solicitation"
of plaintiffs was wholly outside First Amendment
protection. "The first is that a State cannot fore-
close the exercise of constitutional rights by mere
labels. The second is that abstract discussion is
not the only species of communication which the
Constitution protects; the First Amendment also
protects vigorous advocacy, certainly of lawful
ends, against governmental intrusion." This is
classic Brennan-brief, forceful and elegant. The
first answer asserts that state legislation cannot
win simply by begging the constitutional question.
The second answer combines an analysis of mo-
tive with the content of speech in order to decide
the legitimacy of the state's objection.10
Unlike NAACP v. Button, Goldberg v. Kelly'1 is not
a First Amendment case since the major issue was
couched in terms of a Fourteenth Amendment
due process claim. In Goldberg, Justice Brennan
wrote for the Court in holding that welfare bene-
fits were property within the scope of the Four-
teenth Amendment's due process clause and as
such, could not be revoked in the absence of an
evidentiary hearing-prior to the termination of
benefits-in which the welfare recipient had the
option to participate.
Although Goldberg is remembered for its novel
understanding of the property claim, the beauty
of the case may be found at a more basic level. In
Justice Brennan's understanding, the welfare re-
cipient-often uneducated, probably poor, some-
times simply down on his or her luck-has the
right to be heard before the state takes action so
that his or her speech may be considered in the
decision-making process.
Texas v. Johnson12 is, in many ways, the quintes-
sential freedom to speak case even though its sub-
ject of flag-burning is a non-verbal form of com-
munication. Justice Brennan wrote for the Court
in a 5-to-4 decision which held that the govern-
ment's interest in preventing flag desecration was
9 371 U.S. at 429.
10 This second answer will resurface in a discussion of
New York Times v. Sullivan, infra.
11 See generally 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
12 See generally 491 U.S. 397 (1989).
11 Id. at 414.
14 Id. at 408.
15 See id. at 400.
an impermissible content-based restriction on the
freedom of speech.
Justice Brennan noted the "bedrock" First
Amendment principle that "the government may
not prohibit the expression of an idea simply be-
cause society finds the idea itself offensive or disa-
greeable."1 3 Moreover, he acknowledged the his-
toric principle that a primary "function of free
speech under our system of government is to in-
vite dispute."
14
The crux of the opinion, however, turned once
again to the notion of motive for behavior as op-
posed to the behavior itself. The State of Texas,
which criminally prosecuted Johnson for burning
a flag at the 1984 Republican National Conven-
tion, did not maintain that flag-burning per se was
criminal, since the preferred method of disposing
of torn or dirty flags is by burning.15 Rather, the
state maintained that the motive for burning the
flag, viz., to make a political statement offensive to
some, was criminal.' 6 Justice Brennan asserted
that to accept the state's argument on the issue of
motive would be to permit the state to "prescribe
what shall be orthodox.
1 7
The fascinating aspect of the Johnson decision is
in the application of its principles to the disagree-
ment between the majority and the dissenters on
the Court. While the dissenters found the Court's
decision to be an abomination to the flag, Justice
Brennan asserted that "the flag's deservedly cher-
ished place in our community will be strength-
ened, not weakened, by our holding today. Our
decision is a reaffirmation of the principles of
freedom and inclusiveness that the flag best re-
flects, and of the conviction that our toleration of
criticism such as Johnson's is a sign and source of
our strength."'8 While the principles of Justice
Brennan's decision would consistently allow an
opposing opinion to exist unfettered by the threat
of criminal repercussions, it is uncertain that the
dissenting opinions could be freely voiced if their
reasoning was followed since they are 1) minority
views and 2) arguably offensive to the principles
of the flag championed by the majority.1 9
16 See id. at 401.
17 See id. at 415.
18 See Johnson, 491 U.S. at 418.
19 The case provides an excellent example of the reductio
ad absurdum argument. If the minority's opinion is accepted
(viz., that unpopular and offensive speech may be justifiably
squelched) and we add the (true) premise that the minority's
understanding is offensive (in the majority's opinion) to the
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These three cases provide an accurate, albeit
limited, portrayal of Justice Brennan's defense of
the freedom to speak in the face of attempted
governmental suppression. It was a libel case,
however, that provided perhaps the finest exam-
ple of Justice Brennan's commitment to the free-
dom to speak in opposition to those in power.
New York .Times Co. v. Sullivan was a quasi-gov-
ernmental suppression of speech case couched in
a civil libel suit.2 0 Sullivan, a Montgomery, Ala-
bama, City Commissioner, brought suit against
four African-American clergymen and the New
York Times for an admittedly inaccurate advertise-
ment appearing in the Times which was paid for by
the clergymen in order to solicit funds to support
civil rights activities. 21 The flavor of the case was
likened to sedition since the inaccurate com-
ments were directed toward government agencies
under Sullivan's direction, not toward Sullivan
himself.22 The trial jury was instructed to find for
Sullivan as a "public official" if the inaccurate
statements23 in question reflected negatively on
the agencies under his direction.24 The jury re-
turned a verdict for Sullivan which was affirmed
by the Supreme Court of Alabama.
25
Echoing his previous opinion in NAACP v. But-
ton, Justice Brennan maintained that the Supreme
Court would not turn a blind eye to First Amend-
ment principles solely because the Alabama
courts asserted that the Constitution did not pro-
tect libelous statements. Rather, he asserted that
in "deciding the question now, we are compelled
by neither precedent nor policy to give any more
weight to the epithet 'libel' than we have to other
'mere labels' of state law." 26
Arguing the maxim that a demand of absolute
principles that the flag represents, then by the minority's
own reasoning, its opinion may be justifiably squelched.
The minority did not doubt the power ofJustice Brennan's
logic. Indeed, one of the majority's dissents began with the
quote, "a page of history is worth a volume of logic." Id. at
421 (Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting).
20 See generally 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
21 See id. at 256.
22 See id.
23 Some of the inaccuracies were innocuous (African-
American students sang the National Anthem, not "My Coun-
try, 'Tis of Thee'", id. at 258-59) while others were more in-
flammatory (police were present in large numbers on Ala-
bama State College Campus, but did not "ring" the campus,
id. at 259).
24 See id. at 256.
25 See New York Times, 376 U.S. at 256.
26 376 U.S. at 269.
truth from the speaking citizenry would be tanta-
mount to a chilling of political expression, Justice
Brennan stated that a "rule compelling the critic
of official conduct to guarantee the truth of all his
factual assertions-and to do so on pain of libel
judgments virtually unlimited in amount leads
to... 'self-censorship.' "2 7 This line of reasoning
led to the now famous constitutional test requir-
ing "public" persons to prove that a statement was
made with actual malice, i.e., knowledge of falsity
or with reckless disregard of whether it was false
or not, in order to prove libel.
28
Justice Brennan's communications jurispru-
dence reflects a healthy skepticism of governmen-
tal authority. He possessed a "show me, don't tell
me in conclusory terms" attitude. It is, then, per-
haps unsurprising that his personal demeanor re-
flected a style of persuasion and civility as op-
posed to heavy-handedness.
I served Justice Brennan as a law clerk during
the 1974 Term. I entered the Brennan chambers
struck and impressed by the dominance of his
legal thinking. By that time, he had already au-
thored NAACP v. Button, Goldberg v. Kelly and New
York Times v. Sullivan in addition to the landmark
Baker v. Car,29 Katzenbach v. Morgan,3° Green v.
County School Board,31 and Bivens v. Six Unknown
Agents.
3 2
Yet, as I worked with Justice Brennan, I found
that I was as much or more impressed with the
man than the judge. Obviously, this in no way dis-
counts the judge; he will easily stand as one of the
five greatest Justices in the Court's history.
Rather, it is to give special honor to the man.
In reviewing the Brennan corpus while prepar-
ing this tribute, I read a 1962 volume of the Catho-
27 Id. at 279.
28 See id. at 279-80.
29 See generally 369 U.S. 196 (1962) (allowing equal pro-
tection challenges to state apportionment of legislative dis-
tricts and opening the door to judicial reapportionment ac-
cording to one-person, one-vote guidelines).
30 See generally 384 U.S. 641 (1966) (holding that Con-
gress may create remedies to protect constitutional rights,
such as the Voting Rights Act's prohibition of English literacy
tests as prerequisites to voter registration, even when the
Supreme Court had not required such protection).
31 See generally 391 U.S. 430 (1968) (invalidating "free-
dom-of-choice" school desegregation plan and requiring im-
plementation of race-conscious pupil assignment)..
32 See generally 403 U.S. 388 (1971) (recognizing implied
private right of action for damages for violations of constitu-
tional rights committed by federal agents).
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lic University Law Review, which was devoted to the
work of Justice Brennan during his first five years
on the Supreme Court. As history, the volume is
interesting for a variety of reasons, but most spe-
cifically for one author's 33 portrayal of the young
Justice. The portrayal, entitled The Common Sense
of Mr. Justice Brennan,34 describes him as the voice
of reason between the, "liberal" Justice Black and
the "conservative" Justice Frankfurter. He is de-
scribed as "conciliatory and moderate," with a "ne-
gotiator's manner."35 Indeed, 36 years later, the
author's descriptions of the Brennan style and the
Brennan opinion remain valid:
The distinguishing quality of Brennan's pattern of
thought is what may be called massive common sense.
His approach to every case is practical, specific, factual.
Unlike Black or Frankfurter, he rarely lays down sweep-
ing dicta. He gives the impression of reasoning induc-
tively from the facts before him rather than deductively
from his own set of first principles. This, in turn, ac-
counts for the characteristic tone of his opinions.
While some of his colleagues give the impression of
writing for posterity rather than any present audience,
Brennan invariably addresses himself to his brethren
on the Court and his professional colleagues in the law.
He is conciliatory and moderate. His is the negotiator's
manner; one catches in his opinions the overtones of
the conference room mediator and the earnest de-
bater, seeking to persuade rather than overpower.
Those overtones are missing in the opinions of several
of his colleagues. Brennan is neither prophet nor pro-
fessor nor publicist. His tone is that of the practical
man who, even when most deeply convinced of the
rightness of his own position, does not wholly forget
that one or another of his colleagues who differs with
him today may join him in making a different majority
tomorrow. This is not to suggest that there is anything
weakly placating or self-deprecatory in Brennan's work;
he has at his command a resource of lucid, sturdy
prose. But he foregoes the witticism, the epigram, the
twisting personal thrust, if, indeed, these literary de-
vices occur to him; and although he occasionally rises
to indignation, it is an impersonal kind of indignation,
and his language is characteristically calm and good-
humored. One does not turn to Brennan's opinion's
33 William v. Shannon.
34 11 CATH. U. L. Rrv. 3 (Jan., 1962).
35 Id. at 3-4.
36 Id.
37 See id. at 14.
38 See Richard S. Arnold, Mr. Justice Brennan-An Appreci-
ation, 26 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 7, 10 (Summer, 1991).
39 See id.
40 In fact, in an article commenting on judicial civility,
the most inflammatory language ascribed to Justice Brennan
was use of the term "wooden" to describe one of his col-
league's opinions. In an era when the high-water mark of
judicial incivility amounts to biting sarcasm and implied alle-
gations of outright stupidity, a single use of the term
"wooden" during a thirty-four year tenure should stand as no
less than remarkable. See generally Edward McGlynn, Gaffney,
to enjoy their high style, discursive erudition, or the
working out of an iron logic, but one does find in them
a body of reasonable argument reflecting a patient
open-mindedness and a decent, humane spirit.
3 6
The article closes with the hope that the young
Justice would "serve as a bridging influence within
the Court between the absolutist defenders of lib-
erty and the sometimes unrestrained advocates of
self restraint.
37
It was this mediator, this negotiator, this voice
of reason that I came to know and hold in the
highest regard. While history will surely remem-
ber Justice Brennan as the voice of a Court that
tempered the excesses of authority, the legal com-
munity should also remember him as the precep-
tor of civility.
One need look only at one of his many dissents
to see the power of his civility and persuasion.
While it is not uncommon for a minority dissenter
to criticize the ruling of "the majority," Justice
Brennan instead refers magisterially to those in
the majority as "the Court."38 Moreover, Justice
Brennan had a collegial habit of noting points of
agreement with "the Court" before discussing his
criticisms."39 Finally, and most importantly, Jus-
tice Brennan never manifested any element of ac-
rimony in either his written opinions or his spo-
ken word.
40
In contrast to those who believe in the power of
"hardball," Justice Brennan succeeded in using
the tools of congeniality and rationality. Even
though Justice Brennan admitted that he "was
much happier when I wasn't writing as many dis-
sents,"4 ' his reluctance to regress to impertinence
served him well. For example, his well-reasoned
dissenting opinions in General Electric Co. v. Gil-
bertt 2 and Grove City College v. Bell 43 influenced
Congressional action to adopt his position.
4 4
Jr., The Importance of Dissent and the Imperative Judicial Civility,
28 VAL. U.L. REv. 583 (Winter, 1994).
41 Kaplan, A Master Builder, NEWSWEEK, July 30, 1990, at
19, 20, quoted in Norman Dorsen, A Tribute to Justice William
Brennan, Jr., 104 HARv. L. REV. 15, 17 (Nov., 1990).
42 See generally 429 U.S. 125, 146 (1976) (Brennan,J., dis-
senting).
43 See generally 465 U. S. 555, 581 (1984) (Brennan,J., dis-
senting).
44 In Gilbert, the Court held that discrimination on the
basis of pregnancy was outside of Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (1988)).
When Congress passed the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of
1978, Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2096 (codified at 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e, k (1988)), it cited Justice Brennan's dissent which
asserted that the Court's opinion was incongruent with gen-
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So how can one sum up the career of this bril-
liant, compassionate, far-sighted advocate of our
freedom?
Judicially, his legacy has stood the test of time
and his work remains largely intact. Furthermore,
he lived to see the building of a "vital center" on
the current Court after his retirement from the
bench. In this sense, he fulfilled the expectations
of his contemporaries who reviewed his work after
a short five years on the Supreme Court.
der discrimination jurisprudence. See Newport News Ship-
building and Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669, 678
(1983).
In Grove City, the Court held that an institution receiving
federal funds for one function could not be prevented from
discriminating in other areas. When Congress passed The
Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-259, 102
Personally, this was a man who could have no
great regrets. His professional success, great as it
was, was exceeded by his personal integrity and
sense of fair dealing. This was a man who forged
relationships built on reason and compassion. He
was, and is, an archetype for the modem lawyer
and the modem man.
Stat. 28 (codified in scattered sections of 20 U.S.C., 29 U.S.C.
and 42 U.S.C. (1988)), it adopted Justice Brennan's dissent-
ing view in providing that no institution receiving federal
assistance in any amount may discriminate in any of its activi-
ties on the basis of race, sex, age or disability. See Franklin v.
Gwinnett County Pub. Schools, 503 U.S. 60, 73 (1992).
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